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In tlte Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through 
his Guardian, GEORGE A. DAVIS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a 
corporation, and Robert S. Clark, 
Respondents, 
CASE 
NO. 7905 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth here are merely the plaintiff's ver-
sion as to the basis for the complaint, and do not constitute 
facts as introduced as evidence, or findings of fact by the 
court. 
On the 7th day of December, 1951, the plaintiff, a child 
of eleven years of age, was injured while coasting down a 
coasting course created by the action of Provo City Corpora-
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tion by and through its recreation and public safety depart-
ments. The course was· established on a private roadway 
on the property of the Brigham Young University, which 
roadway runs north and south, the north portion being a 
dead end blocked by steel posts. It is at the north end that 
the coasting course commenced. There is a .sharp decline 
from the north end of the roadway down to where it levels 
out at approximately the intersection of the private road-
way with Fifth East Street and Eighth North Street in the 
City of Provo. The coasting course was in such a line as 
to be a continuance north of Fifth East Street in the City 
of Provo, if Fifth East Street continued north past Eighth 
North Street. 
Provo City Corporation had publicized and had made 
public the establishment of this coasting course, and had 
caused signs purporting to regulate the coasting traffic on 
the hill to be placed at various positions on the hill, and 
had traffic barriers placed at the intersection of the streets 
mentioned above. 
On the 7th day of December, 1951, the plaintiff, upon 
hearing of the establishment of the hill through the pub-
licity given to its creation, went to the hill, which was ap-
proximately a mile from his home, to coast. The hill at 
the time was very slick, and the boy was unable to stop his 
sled when coming to the saw horse barrier across the bot-
tom of the hill where it intersects Eighth North Street and 
Fifth East Street. Because he was unable to stop, he went 
under the saw horse and out into Eighth North Street, 
striking an automobile driven by the defendant Robert S. 
Clark, which was proceeding west along ·Eighth North 
Street. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
The complaint does state a cause of action against Pro-
vo City Corporation upon the ground that the injuries 
caused to the plaintiff were the result of the defendant's 
negligence and that the negligent acts of the defendant, 
Provo City Corporation, were not governmental acts such 
as to render the defendant immune from liability. 
POINT II 
The complaint does state a cause of action against Pro-
vo City Corporation upon the ground that the acts com-
plained of constituted an attractive nuisance, and that be-
cause of these acts, the plaintiff was attracted to the coast-
ing area and injured because of its inherent dangers. 
POINT III 
That the complaint states a cause of action against 
Brigham Young University on two grounds, (1) negligence, 
and (2) attractive nuisance, and that the allegations of both 
causes are sufficient to state a valid claim at law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPLAINT DOES STATE A CAUSE OF A:.C-
TION AGAINST PROVO CITY CORPORATION UPON 
THE GROUND THAT THE INJURIES CAUSED TO THE 
PLAINTIFF WERE THE RESULT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND THAT THE NEGLIGENT 
ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT, PROVO CITY CORPORA-
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TION, WERE NOT GOVERNMENTAL ACTS SUCH AS 
TO RENDER THE DEFENDANT IMMUNE FROM LIA-
BILITY. 
In this particular instance, the court made its deter-
mination on the basis that the function of operating this 
coasting area was a governmental function and, therefore, 
was such a function as to render the city immune from lia-
bility. However, this is not the case. The decision of the 
court is representative of a line of cases of ancient origin, 
and does not represent the current trend of the state courts 
of the United States nor the recent decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The rule in Utah, as enunced in the cases 
of Burton vs. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443, 51 
ALR 364; Lund vs. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 
510; Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222,93 P. 570; Lowe 
vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, is as follows: 
"Insofar, however, as a municipal corporation acts 
in its private or proprietary capacity, the general rule 
is that it is liable in tort in the same manner as a pri-
vate corporation * * * * " 
38 A. J. 263. 
The doctrine of immunity has been predicated upon 
various grounds, all of which are archaic and capable of 
little legal logic, the first being that of the strict rule that 
the sovereign is immune, or as it is commonly stated, ''The 
king can do no wrong," or 2) that it is better that an indi-
vidual should suffer an injury than the public should suf-
fer an inconvenience and (3) that liability would tend to 
retard the agents of the city in the performance of their 
duties, for fear of suit being brought against the munici-
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pality. These arguments are thoroughly refuted in 120 
ALR 1377, in which the author quotes an article in 23 Mich. 
L. Rev. 325. 
Such thinking can hardly be tolerated in this modem 
age. These legal maxims have no place in present society 
and under our present government. There is no more rea-
son why the various branches of government should be ex-
empt from liability for their torts than it would be to ex-
empt any other large corporation from liability for its torts. 
The injustice of penalizing a victim of the negligence 
of a municipal corporation who is in no way responsible 
for the unauthorized act has caused some courts, including 
our own Supreme Court, to effect a relaxation of the rule 
and to construe more broadly certain implied and general 
powers of the municipal corporations by holding its acts 
not ultra virus which have been, under more strict con-
structions, held to be governmental functions. For ex-
ample, in the case of Griffen vs. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 
94, the court said: 
"We see no occasion for extending governmental 
immunity from liability for tortious acts of employees, 
by labeling some activity as a governmental function 
simply because the enterprise is municipally owned. 
We are particularly adverse to reading something into 
the statute which would have the effect of permitting 
municipalities to engage in various enterprises only in 
a governmental capacity, when such activities are of 
the type and character of businesses owned and man-
aged by private citizens for pecuniary profit. 
"Municipal ownership of a swimming pool is not 
necessarily in a governmental rather than a proprie-
tary capacity merely because statute authorizing cities 
to establish and maintain swimming pools also author-
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ized other functions which can be exercised only in 
a governmental capacity, since statutory grant of au-
thority to municipality to supervise swimming pools 
and recreation places extends to all swimming pools 
and places of recreation whether in municipal or pri-
vate ownership." 
This, of course, is a swimming pool case. However, 
in practicalities, there is little difference between this case 
and the present case. Actually, there is no more of a gov-
ernmental function in operating a coasting hill than there 
is in operating a swimming pool. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that the question of whether such an operation is 
done for profit is not the test. The Utah Supreme Court 
held this in the case of Burton vs. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 
186, in which it was stated: 
"the test is whether the act is for the common good 
of all without the element of special corporate 
benefit or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no 
liability; if not, there may be liability." 
I would suggest to the Court that this is a case in which 
Provo City could very easily have operated this coasting 
area as is done in many such coasting areas that are pri~ 
vately owned, and that the mere fact that Provo City un~ 
dertook this operation does not render it a governmental 
function, and also the fact that no charge was made for the 
use of the hill does not render it such a function that is gov~ 
ernmental in nature. Utah Statute, Sec. UCA 1943, 15~8~9, 
specifies which functions the city may undertake. How~ 
ever, it does not by so enumerating these functions make 
them governmental functions. The court points this out 
in the Griffen case cited above. 
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The modern tendency is to restrict the doctrine of mu-
nicipal immunity, and the rule is laid out generally as fol-
lows: 
"A municipality cannot escape responsibility for 
the careful performance of a duty which is substan-
tially one of a local or corporate nature because it may 
inure incidentally to the advantage of the public." 
38 A. J. 268, Sec. 574. 
Now in this instance, the coasting area was created in 
a north-eastern section of the city and was available to on-
ly a certain portion of the populace, and was available dur-
ing a certain portion of the year, and was not a permanent 
park or recreation center, and was not, consequently, a 
function which is ordinarily within the province of govern-
ment. 
The City of Provo, in creating this coasting area, sent 
its agents forth, and established it on the property of Brig-
ham Young University at the top of the hill where the coast-
ing commenced, knowing full well that the hill was ex-
tremely steep and that children who used the hill would gain 
a great deal of momentum in traveling down the hill, and 
that because of the very nature of the physical situation, 
the coasters would be unable to stop at the bottom of the 
hill and before entering into Eighth North Street in the 
City of Provo. And that by merely placing a saw-horse 
across the street at the bottom of the incline would not 
prevent the momentum of the coasters in carrying them 
out into Eighth North Street and into the path of travel-
ing vehicles. This allegation alone raises an issue which 
cannot be controverted by the answer of the defendant, Pro-
vo City Corporation, nor can their motion to dismiss be sus-
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tained upon the argument that the acts of Provo City and 
its agents are governmental functions. 
If the danger was so obvious and apparent, as I ·believe 
the plaintiff will be able to prove in this case, then the City 
cannot escape liability even though its acts might otherwise 
have been a governmental function, for the case is not one 
of ordinary negligence. Where the employees of the City 
are doing purely ministerial acts, which they are in the prin-
cipal case, and in the doing of these acts they injure a per-
son, they cannot escape responsibility. This principle has 
been sustained in the case of Hoggard vs. City of Richmond, 
200 S. E. 610, 120 ALR 1368. The court in that case said 
in effect that the principle of governmental immunity can 
no longer be sustained on any modern theory of law and 
justice. 
POINT II 
THE COMPLAINT [)()ES STATE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION AGAINST PROVO CITY CORPORATION UPON 
THE GROUND THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF 
CONSTITUTED AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, AND 
THAT BECAUSE OF THESE ACTS, THE PLAINTIFF 
·WAS ATTRACTED TO THE COASTING AREA AND IN-
JURED BECAUSE OF ITS INHERENT DANGERS. 
The question of whether a coasting area constitutes 
an attractive nuisance will be discussed in Point 4. In this 
particular argument, I shall establish that a municipal cor-
poration is responsible for its actions in creating a nuisance 
which is attractive to children and which, because of its 
inherent defects causes injury to a child who is attracted 
to it. It has been held in the case of Brown vs. Salt L&ke 
City Corporation, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, which is an an-
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alogous case, that the city is responsible where it creates an 
attractive nuisance. The court in that case stated: 
"If the doctrine of the turntable cases is to be 
adopted in this jurisdiction-and we think it should be 
-it seems to us that it should be applied in accordance 
with the principles laid down by the Chief Justice 
Beatty. * * * As against mere intruders or licen-
sees the owner need not maintain his premises in a rea-
sonably safe condition; but as to those who come upon 
them by invitation, express or implied, he owes the duty 
of reasonable care for their safety. That is the gen-
eral rule, and to depart from it in favor of adult per-
sons would cast a burden upon the ownership and do-
minion of private property which would be intolerable. 
But is this right of dominion and use really invaded 
when an exception is made in favor of children of im-
mature judgment and discretion? We have already 
pointed out that, as to adults or children who may come 
upon another premises either by express or implied in-
vitation, the law imposes the duty upon the owner to 
exercise reasonable care for their safety. If, therefore, 
the owner places something upon his premises which 
is easily accessible to children, and which is alluring 
and attractive to their childish propensities, and ex-
cites their curiosity and desire for play, it, in effect 
amounts to an implied invitation to them to come upon 
the premises." Note: Court applied attractive nuisance 
doctrine to city. 
Admittedly, the Brown case is one involving a conduit 
under the city streets; Hlowever, it is nevertheless identical 
in the proposition that the child of the plaintiff was attrac-
ted to the conduit because of its exciting and recreational 
qualities. Children of tender years, such as the plaintiff in 
the principal case, are unaware of the apparent risks in-
volved, purely because they are children, although an adult 
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could not free himself from the responsibility of asssuming 
such a risk, but here we are dealing with children. 
In the case before the Court, it is alleged that Provo 
City Corporation advertised and publicized the creation of 
this coasting area, and the proof will indicate that a news-
paper item was given to the Provo Herald, a newspaper of 
general circulation within Provo City, stating that the hill 
had been created and expressly inviting the use of it. This 
makes the principal case a much stronger case than the 
Brown case, in that parents placed reliance upon the care-
ful creation, maintainance and supervision of the coasting 
area, and that children were induced to use the hill under 
the guise of it being a well-regulated and physically safe fa-
cility. The plaintiff in this case, thought not of the danger 
involved, but only of the thrill of the sleigh ride. 
"It has frequently been laid down as a broad, gen-
eral rule that a muniCipal corporation has no more 
right than a private corporation to create or maintain 
a nuisance, and that an action lies against a munici-
pality for injuries occasioned by a nuisance in any case 
in which, under similar circumstances, such an action 
could be maintained against a private corporation." 
38 A. J. 355. 
The action of Provo City in this case created a situa-
tion quite different than the ordinary case of negligence of 
a municipal body and its agents. In this case, the wrongful 
creation of a situation likely to cause harm to childl'en and 
which is apparent and obvious to responsible and prudent 
men, puts the defendant, Provo City Corporation, in a po-
sition closely related to wilful or intentional wrongdoing. 
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The rule in such a situation has been stated in American 
Jurisprudence as follows: 
"A majority of the courts which have passed upon 
the question have held that the immunity of munici-
pal corporations from liability for acts done in the per-
formance of governmental functions does not extend 
to cases of personal injuries or death resulting from 
a nuisance created or maintained by municipality, and 
that a municipality is liable for such injuries, although 
the nuisance was created or maintained in the course 
of the discharge of public duties or governmental func-
tions." 
38 A. J. 358 .. 
POINT III 
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF AC~ 
TION AGAiNST BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY ON 
TWO GROUNDS, (1) NEGLIGENCE, AND (2) ATTRAC-
TIVE NUISANCE, AND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF 
BOTH CAUSES ARE SUFFICIENT TO STATE A VALID 
CLAIM AT LAW. 
In the arguments . of these points in the District Court, 
the plaintiff offered to amend his complaint specifically by 
inserting the word "negligent" in referring to the acts of 
the defendant, Brigham Young University. The court sta-
ted that it would not be necessary, for it understood that 
the complaint was based upon two theories, i e., negligence, 
and attractive nuisance. If there had been any question in 
the court's mind as to the cause alleged in the complaint, 
the court would have given leave to amend the complaint 
to conform with the cause argued upon the motion. The 
court's decision is based entirely upon the substantive ques-
tion of whether Brigham Young University is liable for 
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acts done by a third party, Provo City Corporation, upon 
its property, Brigham Young University argues that even 
though the acts were done by Provo City Corporation, they 
did not materially change the natural conditions of the hill 
and, therefore, created no condition attractive to children. 
And their further contention is that there is no affirmative 
negligence of Brigham Young University. 
It is always difficult to argue a case on appeal from a 
decision of the District Court in favor of the defendant upon 
a motion to dismiss, for it puts the appellant in the position 
of rebutting the appellant's anticipated argument, for it is 
entirely probable that the appellee's argument on appeal will 
be quite different than its argument before the District 
Court, and because there is no memorandum to indicate up-
on what particular ground the Court based its conclusion. 
Nevertheless, I do not doubt that the defendant, Brigham 
Young University, is responsible on both grounds stated 
above. 
Upon the theory of negligence, Brigham Young Uni-
versity is responsible for the following reasons: (1) That 
it allowed Provo City Corporation to come upon its prop-
erty and establish a coasting course which, by its physical 
characteristics, was manifestly dangerous and which any 
ordinarily reasonable prudent man could foresee the prob-
able consequences of the creation of this coasting course. 
Here, Brigham Young University not only saw the crea-
tion of the course but was given notice of it by the pub-
licity given to it by Provo City's own recreation department, 
and articles in the Provo Herald, a newspaper, and yet Brig-
ham Young University stood back and closed its eyes to all 
the obvious dangers, and then it argues to the court that 
it did nothing wrong; that it had no duty to the plaintiff; 
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that it by no affirmative act injured the paintiff. Can 
it be said that a property owner can sit idly back and al-
low a third person to invite minor children into a place 
of peril, when that property owner had the exclusive con-
trol over the hazardous or perilous instrumentality? Ar-
gument that the non-feazance of the defendant, Brigham 
Young University was not the proximate cause of the in-
jury is not sound. The courts have set down the following 
rules for governing such a situation, some of which are set 
out as follows. 
"Where two wrongdoers contribute to the injury 
by negligent act and ommission respectively, negligent 
act of one will not exculpate other's negligent ommis-
sion." 
215 Cal. 449. 
"The doctrine may, however, be applied to a con-
dition due to the natural topography of the premise and 
partly to the operations carried on thereon. It is not 
necessary to charge one with liability that he should 
have created the dangerous condition, but the owner 
or person in charge may be held liable for injury re-
sulting from his failure to safeguard a dangerous con-
dition created by others with his knowledge and con-
sent, especially where a condition which he created 
contributes to the injury." 
65 C. J. S. 465, Sec. 29 (7). 
Recent cases have firmly established the principle that 
non-feasance is tantamount to mis-feasance in cases. of this 
nature, and that it is negligence not to prevent the crea-
tion of a dangerous condition likely to injure others. The 
mere fact that this negligence concurred with the negligence 
of another person to cause the injury does not alter the fact 
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that the non-fesance will be the proximate cause of the in-
jury. If the injury in this case would not have been caused 
but for the negligence of the Brigham Young University, 
then clearly the Brigham Young University is responsible. 
This is one of those cases in which the ''but for" rule is ap-
plicable. 
"If negligence of defendant is one of proximate 
causes of injury of which plaintiff complains, he can-
not escape liability by showing that negligence of third 
person also contributed to the injury and that the acci-
dent would not have happened but for such negligence 
of the third person." 
Cummings v. Kendall, 93 P .2d 633, 34 Cal. 
App. 2d 379. 
"Where concurring acts of different persons al-
though acting independently, combine to produce con-
dition which is actiohabie negligence, each is respon-
sible to injured party for entire result, though act or 
negligence alone of one might not have produced the 
resUlt complained of." 
Missouri ·Motor Distributing Co. v. Baker, 39 
P .. 2d 544, 170 Okl. 183. 
Even though Provo City Corporation may have used 
the land on the property of the Brigham Young University 
without permission, and even though the injury to the plain-
tiff may have occurred off of the property of the Brigham 
Young University, if the force that caused the injury was 
set in motion on the property of the Brigham Young Uni-
versity, and due to the conduct or lack of it by the Brig-
ham Young University it cannot avoid the responsibility 
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Company, 65 Utah 96, 234 
P. 300, was a similar case to the principal case, in that it 
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involved several tort feasors, and contained the possibilities, 
at least at the pleading stage, that one of the defendants 
might be an intervening cause, and, in fact, the defendant's 
appeal was based upon the very contention that counsel 
for Brigham Young University will argue. The Utah Su-
preme Court in that case cited several c·ases stating what 
proximate cause is and to the effect that the question wheth-
er the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause was 
a question for the jury. It appears that the Utah Supreme 
Court adopts the rule expressed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. 
S. 469, at page 474: 
"The true rule is, that what is the proximate cause 
of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. 
It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. 
It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circum-
stances of fact attending it. The primary cause may 
be the proximate cause of a disaster, though it may 
operate through successive instruments, as an article 
at the end of a chain may be moved by a force applied 
to the other end, that force being the proximate cause 
of the movement, or as in the oft-cited case of the squib 
thrown in the market place. 2 B. Rep. 892. The ques-
tion always is: Was there an unbroken connection be-
tween the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous 
operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous sue-
session of events, so linked together as to make a nat-
ural whole or was there some new independent cause 
intervening between the wrong and the injury? It is 
admitted that the rule is difficult of application. But 
it is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding 
that negligence or an act not amounting to wanton 
wrong, is the proximate cause of injury, it must appear 
that the injury was the natural and probable conse-
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quence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it 
ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attend-
ing circumstances.'' 
The mere fact that the injury occurs at some other lo-
cation has no material bearing upon the question of proxi-
mate cause. The test is whether the Brigham Young Uni-
versity could have prevented the injury had it exercised 
reasonable care and prudence, and if by not so exercising 
care and prudence, caused the injury to the plaintiff. The 
court stated in Styer v. City of Reading, 61 A.2d 382, 360 
Pa. 212, as follows: 
"Generally, a property owner who permits a third 
person to use his land is, if present, under a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care to prevent him from intention-
ally harming others or from so conducting himself as 
to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, 
if the owner knows or has reason to know that he has 
the ability to control the third person, and knows or 
should know of the necessity and opportunity for ex-
ercising control." 
Styer v. City of Reading, 61 A. 2d 382, 360 
Pa. 212. 
The rule is further stated in the following cases: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bod-
ily harm caused to persons outside the land by a struc-
ture or other artificial condition thereon, which the 
possessor realized, or should realize, as involving an un-
reasonable risk of such harm, if the possessor has cre-
ated the condition, or the condition is created by a third 
person with the possessor's consent or acquiescence 
while the land is in his possesSion." 
65 C. J. S. 610, Sec. 94. 
McCarthy v. Ference, 58 A.2d 49, 538 Pa. 485. 
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"The negligent act or ommission, in order to be 
the "proximate cause" of an injury must be the cause 
which produces the injury, but need not be the sole 
cause, or the last or nearest cause, it being sufficient 
if it concurs with some other cause, acting at the same 
time, which in combination with it causes the injury or, 
it sets in motion a chain of circumstances and operates 
on them in a continuous sequence, unbroken by a new 
or independent cause; the question being determined, 
not by the existence or non-existence or intervening 
events, but by their character and the natural connec-
tion between the original act or ommission and the in-
jurious consequences.'' 
Seth v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 89 N. E. 
452, 457, 241 Ill 252. 
24 LRA U. S. 978. 
34 Words and Phrases 759. 
As to the question of whether this is an attractive nui-
sance in which the defendant, Brigham Young University, 
is responsible for, we shall have to assume that the acts 
alleged in the complaint are true. Brigham Young Univer-
sity will probably argue that there has been no material 
change in the natural condition of the hill and therefore, 
there is no attractive nuisance. What constitutes sufficient 
change in the natural condition of the hill as to make it at-
tractive under the doctrine of attractive nuisance is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, as is the question of proximate 
cause. It is not within the authority of the trial court to 
arbitrarily rule that the negligent acts of the defendant as 
alleged in the complaint are not the proximate cause of the 
injury, or that the acts complained of do not constitute an 
attractive nuisance, for these questions are within the pro-
vince of the jury. 
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Hlow much alteration is sufficient to cause the natural 
condition to become extraordinarily attractive is certainly 
a question of fact for the jury. In this instance, it has been 
alleged that Provo City Corporation placed upon the hill 
signs purporting to regulate the traffic of the coasters us-
ing the hill, and also that barriers were set up blocking the 
course from any other type of traffic, and publicity was 
circulated as to the establishment of the area as a coasting 
course, all of which are artificial factors tending to change 
the natural state of the hill. These are sufficient to alter 
the natural condition of the hill to a status in which it at-
tracted children that it would not of its own nature do. It 
has been held that: 
"Apart from a limited class of objects and condi-
tions which in any event, excite the curiosity and fur-
nish an instrument by which the natural and inborn 
instinct of a child for play and adventure can be satis-
fied for the moment, and which are known to be fraught 
with peril to children of tender years who meddle there-
with, and another class of objects which are so ordi-
nary, in such common use, and so safe, as to belie any 
attempt to discover either an attractive quality or a 
danger in them, the particular object involved is not at 
all conclusive of iability. The circumstances of size, 
location, structure, and contour may render even a sand 
pile or a sand bin an attractive nuisance." 
38 A. J. 817, Sec. 150. , 
60 ALR 1455. 
The test is not the artificialness of the condition, . but 
whether · the condition was a sufficient allurement to at-
tract children upon the premises, and that the condition was 
fraught with danger to young children such as would rea-
sonably require that precautions be taken to prevent injury 
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to the children. It does not matter who created the attrac-
tiveness as long as the property owner has reason to an-
ticipate the child's presence, and that injury is likely to oc-
cur from the connection between the child and the condition. 
"Properly, the reason for the child's presence is 
material only as bearing on the question whether his 
presence was reasonably to have been anticipated. 
* * * argument * * * On principle, therefore, it would 
seem that if there was reason to anticipate the presence 
of children, it would make no difference how the child 
who was injured happened to come upon the premises." 
36 ALR 138. 
''Under what appears to be a better basis for the 
attractive nuisance doctrine namely, that the owner 
or occupant owes the duty to use ordinary care for the 
safety of children whose presence he reasonably might 
anticipate the reason for the injured child's presence 
upon the premises is unimportant so long as it appears 
that the owner or occupant had reason to anticipate 
the presence of children. A proprietor who permits 
children to use unsafe premises as a playground must 
use reasonable care to prevent them from being injured 
by some dangerous instrumentality upon the premises 
which, by reason of their childish impulses, m~y be al-
luring to them." 
38 A. J. 812, Sec. 146. 
"It is not necessary to charge one with liability 
that he should have created the dangerous condition, 
but the owner or a person in charge may be held liable 
for injury resuting from his failure to safeguard a dan-
gerous condition created by others with his knowledge 
and consent, especially where a condition which he 
created contributed to the injury." 
45 C. J. 768, Sec. 168. 
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I think the rule is well established that it matters not 
who created the dangerous condition as long as that condi-
tion was known to the property owner, or should have been 
known by him. In this instance, there is no logical reason 
why the Brigham Young University did not know of the 
condition or could have known by the use of ordinary care. 
Anticipating that the defendant, Brigham Young Univer-
sity, will argue that because the injury occurred outside 
the premises of the Brigham Young University, there is no 
liability. I think it is sufficient to cite the case of Hynes v. 
New York Central R. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898, 
17 ALR 803. In that case, the defendant's premises abut-
ted on a navigable river, and a springboard had been erec-
ted, fastened to defendant's land, and projecting, so that 
it was over the river. Plaintiff, with other boys, was 
swimming in the river, and climbed on the springboard 
to dive therefrom. As he was about to dive, being then 
on the end of the springboard over the river, a cross-arm 
fell from one of the defendant's poles, carrying with it 
high-tension electric wires. The wires struck plaintiff, threw 
him from the shattered springboard into the river , and 
caused his death. It was held that the defendant could not 
escape liability on the ground that the plaintiff was a tres-
passer merely because the springboard was attached to his 
property. 
The case is analogous in that injury occurred to the 
plaintiff outside the property line of the New York Central 
Railroad Company because of a force set in motion by the 
defendant, New York Central Railroad Company. 
Another case that is in point in this particular is the 
case of Rost v. Parker Washington Company, 176 Ill. A. 
245, 249, which held: 
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"To the contention that there is nothing danger-
ous per se in a sand pile and that therefore, it is not, 
in and of itself, an attractive nuisance, it is near enough 
to say that if this be conceded, yet when the sand pile 
is placed so near the bank of a river that a fall from the 
sand pile would naturally cause a child to fall into the 
water, it must be regarded as dangerous, and that it 
should reasonably be anticipated and guarded against 
by the owner of premises located adjacent to a public 
street." 
And also the case of Katz v. Helbing, 10 Pac. 2nd 1001, 
215 Cal. 449, in which the owners and contractor were held 
liable to a streetcar passenger injured by lime thrown by 
boys playing near a building being constructed. This was 
true even though the injury occurred outside the premises 
of the property owner because, it was held, he could reason-
ably anticipate such an occurrence and should have taken 
steps· to prevent it. 
"If an injury is produced by concurrent effect of 
two separate wrongful acts, each act is the proximate 
cause of injury, and neither act can operate as an ef-
ficient intervening cause with regard to the other. * * * 
The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate 
the occurrence of the other concurrent cause will not 
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence 
was a cause of injury." 
Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 232 P. 
2d 262, 104 A. C. A. 791. 
"If party guilty of act of negligence might rea-
sonably have anticipated subsequent intervening cause, 
which is not consequence of first act of negligence, as 
natural and probable consequence of his own negligence, 
connection between his negligence and injury is not bro-
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ken; but if act of third person, which is immediate cause 
of injury is such as in exercise of reasonable diligence 
would not be anticipated, and third person is not under 
control of one guilty of first act of negligence, connec-
tion is broken and first act or ommission is not "proxi-
mate cause" of injury." 
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Cor-
num, 63 P. 2d 639, 49 Ariz. 1. 
It is probable that the defendants will argue that they 
are not responsible because of the intervening act of a third 
person, Robert E. Clark, in this case. I would simply state 
in rebuttal to that argument that no cause is an intervening 
cause such as to relieve a person from liability when that 
cause can reasonably be anticipated. In this case nothing 
could be more obvious that the peril arose from the possi-
bility of the coasters running into cars traveling on Eighth 
North Street or Fifth East Street, because the very path 
of the course led into those streets. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I think it may justly be said that a case 
has been stated in the complaint, and that if there are ques-
tions of fact, they should be resolved by a jury. OT if there 
are minor errors in pleading, which have caused the de-
fendants no uncertainty as to the plaintiff's contention, the 
plaintiff should be allowed to amend his complaint to cor-
rect such defects, and that a dismissal of the case upon any 
ground is unjust, inequitable, and not in harmony with the 
law. The plaintiff, therefore, respectfully requests that the 
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decision of the lower court be reversed, that the cause be 
remanded to the lower court for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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